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Abstract 
Following the shooting of Mark Duggan by police on the 4
th
 August 2011, there were riots in 
many large cities in the UK. As the rioting was widely perceived to be perpetrated by the 
urban poor, links were quickly made with Britain’s welfare policies. In this paper, we 
examine whether the riots, and the subsequent media coverage, influenced attitudes toward 
welfare recipients. Using the British Social Attitudes survey, we use multivariate difference-
in-differences regression models to compare attitudes toward welfare recipients among those 
interviewed before (pre-intervention: i.e. prior to the 6
th
 of August) and after (post-
intervention: 10
th
 of August – 10th of September) the riots occurred (N = 3,311). We use 
variation in exposure to the media coverage to test theories of media persuasion in the context 
of attitudes toward welfare recipients. Before the riots, there were no significant differences 
between newspaper readers and non-readers in their attitudes towards welfare recipients. 
However, after the riots, attitudes diverged. Newspaper readers became more likely than non-
readers to believe that those on welfare did not really deserve help, that the unemployed 
could find a job if they wanted to and that those on the dole were being dishonest in claiming 
benefits. Although the divergence was clearest between right-leaning newspaper and non-
newspaper readers, we do not a find statistically significant difference between right- and 
left-leaning newspapers. These results suggest that media coverage of the riots influenced 
attitudes towards welfare recipients; specifically, newspaper coverage of the riots increased 
the likelihood that readers of the print media expressed negative attitudes towards welfare 
recipients when compared with the rest of the population.   
 
Keywords: Welfare, Social Attitudes, Riots, Mass Media  
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Introduction 
Following the shooting of Mark Duggan by police on the 4
th
 August 2011, there were riots in 
many large cities in England. The riots began in London on the 6
th
 of August following a 
protest over Mark Duggan’s death. They then spread to a number of other English cities; 
lasting around six days before petering out. The riots generated both looting and arson, 
receiving blanket coverage in the UK media. As the rioting was widely perceived to be 
perpetrated by the urban poor, links were quickly made with Britain’s welfare policies. An e-
petition was posted on a government website calling for rioters to ‘loose [sic] all benefits’. It 
rapidly gained more than 250,000 signatures and received widespread media attention 
(Mains, 2011). On the 11
th
 of August, the government explicitly made the connection 
between the riots and welfare policy. Iain Duncan Smith, the Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions, noted to the media that he was considering changes to an upcoming welfare reform 
bill, adding an amendment which would cut welfare benefits to convicted rioters (Porter and 
Kirkup, 11 Aug 2011). These events led to widespread media debate regarding class, welfare, 
and poverty, and brought the issue of the deservingness of welfare recipients to the fore. But 
what impact did the riots, and the subsequent media coverage, have on attitudes toward 
welfare recipients? Using this national media event, we analyse the impact of the media on 
attitudes towards the welfare state and also welfare recipients. 
 
There is substantial interest among social scientists in the role the media plays in shaping 
political attitudes and in democracies more broadly (Mccombs and Shaw, 1972, Brynin and 
Newton, 2003, Drew and Weaver, 2006). While it is commonly assumed that the media have 
some influence on political attitudes and preferences, there is ongoing debate as to the nature 
and extent of this effect (Bartels, 1993, Drew and Weaver, 2006). During the 1990s and early 
2000s, numerous studies documented the persuasive power of the mass media (Bartels, 1993, 
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Prior, 2013, Ladd and Lenz, 2009). However, fragmentation of media markets due to 
increasingly personalized media choices has led some to hypothesize that the media now has 
only ‘minimal effects’ on attitudes (Bennett and Iyengar, 2008). In this paper, we examine 
these competing hypotheses and consider some of their implications by observing whether 
media coverage influenced attitude change in response to the 2011 English riots. 
 
Minimal effects? Persuasion and the media 
 
Much of the literature on the persuasive power of the media has focused on whether members 
of the public change their attitudes or voting preferences in response to some media message 
or campaign. One set of media-persuasion theories argues that the media can have a sizeable 
impact on political attitudes. Media coverage tends to increase awareness of political events 
among those exposed (Iyengar and Reeves, 1997). Newspaper endorsements of a particular 
party increase the likelihood of readers voting for that party (Ladd and Lenz, 2009) and 
economic expectations among the public are more positive if the media reports ‘good’ 
economic news (Gavin and Sanders, 2003).  
 
This research has mostly been observational in nature. However, there have been a number of 
experimental studies attempting to test whether media coverage can persuade people to adopt 
particular political ideas (Levendusky, 2013). Such studies show that party identification is 
more malleable than attitudes and values (Gerber et al., 2009). Similar results have been 
observed in quasi-experimental studies. One set of natural experiments tracked the 
differential roll-out of Fox News in U.S. towns. Exposure to Fox News, when it became 
available, increased the vote share of the Republican party by approximately 10% among 
viewers (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007).  
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Experimental studies have a number of advantages in terms of isolating a causal effect of 
media representations but also have some limitations. Replicating the behaviour and decision-
making processes found in the real world has proven difficult in the artificial setting of the 
laboratory (Prior, 2013). Field experiments (where participants are randomly assigned to read 
particular real-life newspapers) may not correspond to actual media use, or may not apply to 
readers who already subscribe to the ‘intervention’ newspapers (Prior, 2013). Additionally 
not all subjects will willingly read print media (Levendusky, 2013), and effects may also 
extend to non-readers, who may be exposed through diffusion via social networks. It is also 
likely that the media’s effects vary considerably with individual receptivity, societal 
circumstances, and with the polarisation of the media context itself (Zaller, 1992). 
 
Taking these criticisms in account, another strand of empirical research has characterised the 
impact of the media on political attitudes as highly variable (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010) 
and  “minimal at best” (Druckman, 2005). This marks a return to many of the classic studies 
in the field, which observed that the media exhibited “minimal effects” on attitudinal 
formation or conversion (Klapper 1960). Instead, media consumption is argued to simply 
reinforce pre-existing attitudes (Norris, 2006).  
 
What little power the media possessed to alter people’s political attitudes may have been 
further eroded by changes in mass media consumption patterns (Bennett and Iyengar, 2008). 
Rising numbers of media outlets, for example news websites and digital television channels, 
have fragmented the market and may have led to an ‘individualisation’ of media consumption 
(Arceneaux et al., 2013). People tend to avoid information that conflicts with their pre-
existing values and beliefs (Prior, 2013). Increasing diversification of the media market 
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allows people to avoid conflicting information more easily – to restrict their news 
consumption to only those sources which affirm their existing beliefs (Levendusky, 2013). 
Further, this fragmentation has led to the decline of the inadvertent audience – those who 
would watch because they had no other choice. This group can now potentially avoid news 
media altogether (Prior, 2007).  
 
Yet there are reasons to be cautious about hypothesizing a minimal effect of the media on 
public attitudes in the UK, particularly in terms of newspapers. Much of the above cited 
empirical work has been conducted in the US. While daily circulation of the UK print media 
has declined by 4 million over the last 20 years, the UK print media market, unlike the US, 
continues to be dominated by a few national newspapers which remain a major source of 
political information (Brynin and Newton, 2003). Again, unlike the US, these UK 
newspapers are highly partisan, with the overwhelming majority leaning towards the political 
right. Only 15% of all newspaper circulation in 2010 supported the Labour party during the 
2010 election (Wring and Deacon, 2010). Newspaper readers are therefore frequently 
exposed to right-leaning arguments and attitudes. Despite this decline in circulation, the 
greater degree of homogeneity in the UK context suggests media exposure may continue to 
influence political attitude formation and change.  
 
This minimal effects debate has also spurred other research documenting alternative 
mechanisms of media influence, including information, agenda-setting, and framing. While 
mass media communicate information most citizens remained relatively uninformed about 
particular topics. Rather than using the media as a source of developing detailed knowledge, 
most use the media as a heuristic through which to make decisions that emulate the behaviour 
of the relatively well-informed (e.g., journalists) (Lupia, 1994). Agenda-setting theorists 
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argue that the media shapes the picture of the world in people’s heads which, in turn, creates 
a sense of what the most important current issues are, e.g. immigration (Mccombs and Shaw, 
1972). Media also affects framing, the process by which people develop a particular 
conception of a specific topic, which in turn influences attitudes (Chong and Druckman, 
2007). For example, certain newspapers may frame the riots within the context individual 
moral failure or they may frame it as a response to material deprivation (Lightowlers, 2015). 
Selecting a particular frame for the riots may then influence whether people feel sympathy for 
the rioters.  
 
Whether or not the media is able to influence public opinion through these processes has 
implications for its role in a functioning democracy (Baker, 2007). The rise of the mass 
media has been coupled with concerns that a small number of actors influences public 
opinion through media content. However, if the media has only minimal effects on political 
attitudes then the influence of ownership on content becomes less important. By contrast, if 
the media is able to shape political attitudes through persuasion, agenda-setting and/or 
framing, and ownership influences content, then the role of ownership and the media in 
facilitating public debate in a democracy becomes a critical issue. These concerns formed 
part of the motivation for the recent Leveson inquiry into press standards in the UK, which 
drew substantial public attention by shining a light on the relationships between the media 
and political leaders.   
 
Media coverage of the 2011 riots – the link to welfare recipients 
 
Although the print media in the UK remains highly partisan and right-leaning, is there 
evidence that this influenced reporting of the riots?  
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Certainly, prominent political leaders on the right made an explicit link between welfare 
recipients and the riots. Prime Minister David Cameron suggested that if people in social 
housing “misbehave, [they could] be thrown out of [their] house” (11/8/11). As noted above, 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions Iain Duncan Smith (supported by the Prime 
Minister) also called for extensions to the law allowing the government to remove state 
assistance from those convicted of rioting (15/8/11). 
 
This relationship between the riots and welfare benefits was also reflected in mainstream 
media coverage. However, there were strong differences between media outlets, both in the 
frequency with which the riots-welfare link was made, and in the tenor of this content. To 
investigate these differences, we examined coverage of the riots in two right and left-leaning 
newspapers (The Daily Mail/Mail on Sunday, and the Guardian/Observer), and on the BBC 
News website (the UK’s most popular internet news source at this time, based on data from 
the British Social Attitudes Survey) (see Web Appendix 1 for more details on how we 
examined newspaper coverage).  
 
Searching the Lexis Nexis news database for the period August 6
th
 – Sep 10th (the week of 
the riots and the month following) we found 893 articles across the four newspapers which 
directly addressed the riots. Within this group we then identified 109 articles which 
additionally included a reference to welfare benefits (12% of the total coverage of the riots in 
these newspapers). Examining the sources separately, we found that 9% of 
Guardian/Observer and 18% of Daily Mail/MoS articles on the riots made a connection to 
welfare. Searching the BBC News online archive using the same method we found that only 
4% of BBC News articles on the riots made the link to welfare. 
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We subsequently manually coded articles linking the riots to welfare into the following three 
categories: 1. Positive (articles supportive of welfare claimants, e.g., an article describing the 
proposal to remove benefits from convicted rioters as “fundamentally wrongheaded” 
(Comment is Free, 29/8/11); 2. Negative (articles critical of welfare claimants, e.g., an article 
citing “welfare handouts” as one of the factors leading to the behaviour of the “young thugs” 
(Shipman, 11/8/11); and 3. Neutral (articles with a balanced view, e.g., an article discussing 
the proposal to dock benefits for convicted rioters without positive or negative commentary 
(Wintour, 7/09/11). 
 
Using this coding scheme, we found that 59% of Guardian/Observer articles linking the riots 
to welfare were positive, 34% were neutral, and 6% were negative. In the Daily Mail/MoS 
7% were positive, 13% were neutral, and 80% were negative. On the BBC News website 
10% were positive, 90% were neutral, and none were negative. This largely neutral line taken 
by the BBC News website is also likely to have been reflected in its television coverage of 
the riots. 
 
Consumers of different sources of news media received diverging pictures of the riots. 
Newspaper readers, and particularly readers of the right-leaning Mail papers, were exposed to 
a substantial volume of coverage linking the riots with the welfare system and with welfare 
recipients; whereas readers relying primarily on the BBC News website were not so exposed. 
Readers of the Mail would also have been more frequently exposed to coverage which 
portrayed welfare benefit claimants in a negative light and argued that welfare dependency 
was a strong cause of the riots. Coverage of this type was also common in other right-leaning 
newspapers such as The Sun and The Daily Express. In contrast, non-readers (e.g., web or TV 
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news consumers) may become more sympathetic to welfare recipients because the coverage 
in these alternative sources was more likely to explain the riots in terms of deprivation or 
other social explanations. People are obviously exposed to a variety of media sources and so  
readers of left-leaning papers or of BBC News were aware of the government’s linking of 
welfare policy to the riots; but such claims would have been more consistently 
counterbalanced (or potentially overwhelmed, in the case of left-wing newspapers) by other 
viewpoints.   
 
Hypotheses 
The media coverage of the riots allowed us to test theories of media persuasion in the context 
of attitudes toward welfare recipients. The riots were a huge national event in the UK and 
received blanket media coverage. Readers of the print media were presented with very 
different messages about the rioters than were non-readers, specifically with respect to the 
link between the riots and welfare claimants. We would therefore expect attitudes toward 
welfare recipients to diverge between these groups after the riots had occurred. Specifically, 
we expected that after the riots the attitudes of newspaper readers would differ more strongly 
in a negative direction from those of non-readers. We predicted that this effect would be 
strongest between readers of right-wing newspapers, such as The Sun and The Daily Mail, 
and non-readers.  
 
Commentary linking welfare recipients to the riots focused most strongly on the concept of 
‘deservingness’. That is, the debate centred on whether rioters (the majority of whom were 
assumed to be claiming state benefits) were deserving of welfare. We therefore predicted that 
the effect of newspaper coverage of the riots would be strongest for attitudes relating to 
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deservingness; for example, whether people believed that most people receiving welfare 
really deserved help. 
 
Data and method 
 
We used data from the 2011 wave of the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey (N=3,311). 
The BSA is an annual cross-sectional survey that uses multi-stage stratified random sampling 
to obtain a nationally representative sample of the British adult population. The sample of 
addresses was drawn from the Postcode Address File and one adult (18+) was selected within 
each selected dwelling unit. Weighting is used to correct for the unequal selection 
probabilities arising from these procedures. More details of the survey are available from the 
UK Data Archive (Stafford, 2011). Data collection for the 2011 wave began in June 2011 and 
ended in November 2011. Respondents interviewed prior to the riots (i.e. prior to the 6
th
 of 
August) constituted the pre-treatment sample, and those interviewed in the month after the 
riots (10
th
 of August – 10th of September) constituted the post-treatment sample. In order to 
focus on the immediate aftermath of the riots, we excluded respondents interviewed while the 
riots were still ongoing, and those interviewed more than a month after they were over. The 
interview date variable is not publicly available in the 2011 version of the data set but is 
available from NatCen on request (subject to a small processing fee). 
 
One of the aims of the BSA survey is to assess attitudes towards the welfare state and toward 
recipients of welfare. Media coverage linking the riots to welfare policy focused strongly on 
whether welfare claimants were truly deserving of the help they received. Consequently we 
primarily examined the impact of the media’s coverage of the riots on responses to three 
attitudinal items in the BSA (each of these items was put as a statement, with which 
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respondents were required to indicate their agreement on a 1-5 scale – we re-scored these 
items such that 1 indicated strong disagreement and 5 strong agreement): 
 
1. Many people who get social security don’t really deserve any help 
2. Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one 
3. Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another 
 
We also examined changes in attitudes toward the welfare state in general using the BSA’s 
welfarism scale. This is a cumulative measure derived from eight questions; including 
whether respondents believe the welfare state is Britain’s greatest achievement and whether 
welfare stops people from standing on their own two feet. In the BSA dataset, this item is 
scored on a 1-5 scale, with lower scores indicating greater support for the welfare state. In our 
analysis we have inverted the scale to aid interpretation.  
 
As a check on our findings, we replicated our primary analyses in the 2005, 2007, and 2008 
waves of the BSA. These are waves for which the exact interview date of each participant is 
publicly available, and in which no nationwide rioting occurred. 
 
Study design 
The occurrence of the riots in roughly the middle of the 2011 BSA data collection period 
create conditions approximating a natural experiment. Natural experiments commonly have 
three characteristics: 1) they are observational studies, 2) where some people are exposed to a 
particular intervention or event and others are not, and 3) the exposure to the intervention is 
not controlled by the researchers.  
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One important component of natural experiments is that exposure to the intervention should 
approximate the conditions of an actual experiment. In other words, assignment to the 
intervention should be random or ‘as-if’ random. In this study we assume that BSA data 
collection was not causally related to the riots, and that the riots did not affect the data 
collection (i.e. who was sampled and when they were sampled). Proceeding from this 
assumption, we argue that the pre-riots data collection forms one nationally representative 
sample and the post-riots data collection forms another nationally representative sample. The 
only difference between these two groups should be their knowledge of the riots.  
 
If this is not the case then it is possible that our results may have been influenced by some 
confounding factor. For example, did the riots change 1) the number of people reading a 
newspaper, 2) the ideological slant of the newspapers that individuals read, or 3) support for 
particular political parties? We found that the riots were not associated with a shift in the 
ideology of newspaper readership (p = 0.16) or in the number of people who were reading a 
newspaper (p = 0.96). We also observed no change in party identification across this period 
(p = 0.14). We also tested whether there were differences in the socio-demographics of the 
sample before and after the riots but found no qualitative differences between these periods 
(Table 1). 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Further we examined whether there were regional differences in the data collection. Here we 
found that Welsh respondents (n = 135) were more common before the riots while Scottish 
respondents were more common after the riots (n = 167). As relatively small proportions of 
the entire sample, these variations are unlikely to influence our results (see Table 1). Both 
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Wales and Scotland are left-leaning areas that might be more sympathetic to welfare 
recipients and so the influence of the data collection on the sample composition would be 
minimal (given that the Welsh sample is more common before the riots and the Scottish 
sample after). This is confirmed in Table 1 where support for the Conservative party does not 
vary over time. We also find no difference in whether people support both increasing taxation 
and spending more on welfare, education, and health across this same period (Difference 
between pre- and post-riots sample = 0.002, p = 0.95). To ensure these differences are not 
altering our results we adjust for region in our models as a robustness check. 
 
Statistical analysis 
 
To estimate the effect of the media on attitudes toward welfare recipients we used difference-
in-difference models (DiD). DiD models are a form of fixed-effects estimation which 
estimate differences in the mean value of an outcome of interest for two (or more) 
populations over a specific time period (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). This approach removes 
some of the bias created by consistent differences between these groups (Angrist and Pischke, 
2009). The strength of this econometric technique is that it mimics an experimental research 
design using observational data by estimating the effect of an intervention on an outcome by 
comparing the average change in the intervention group with the average change in the non-
intervention group. Ideally, repeated observations would be measured within the same 
individuals over time but this technique is widely used with repeated cross-sectional data 
(Angrist and Pischke, 2009). One of the innovative components of this research is combining 
this within sample contrast (which views the data as repeated cross-sections) with this DiD 
approach. This modelling framework estimates differences in attitudes toward welfare 
recipients before and after the riots for newspaper readers vs. non-readers.  
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Eq. 1: 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 = (?̅?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡,   𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 −  ?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒,   𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑) − (?̅?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡,   𝑛𝑜𝑛 −  ?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒,   𝑛𝑜𝑛) 
?̅? is a measure of the average level of support for welfare recipients among a particular 
group of people (readers versus non-readers) at a particular time (pre- and post-riots). ?̅? is a 
vector of three different attitude measures, as described above. The subscript Post refers to 
those people interviewed after the riots while the subscript Pre indicates those who were 
interviewed before the riots. The subscript read indicates those who self-reported reading a 
newspaper either before or after riots while the subscript non refers to those who self-reported 
that they did not read a newspaper before or after the riots. To clarify this estimation 
procedure, consider Jane, who was interviewed after the riots and reads a newspaper. Her 
answers to these attitudinal questions about welfare recipients (𝑊𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡,   𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑) will be included 
in the measure of the average level of support for welfare recipients among other individuals 
who were also interviewed after the riots and who read a newspaper (?̅?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡,   𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑). However, 
because of this she cannot be a member of any of the other three averages (?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒,   𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑, 
?̅?𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡,   𝑛𝑜𝑛, ?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑒,   𝑛𝑜𝑛). The intervention effect is our coefficient of interest and is the 
difference between these two observed effects for readers and non-readers, yielding the main 
difference-in-differences estimator (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). 
 
To put this equation (eq. 1) into a linear regression framework we can write the difference-in-
difference estimator as: 
 
Eq 2: 𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑅𝑖𝑜𝑡𝑠𝑡 +
 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 × 𝑅𝑖𝑜𝑡𝑠𝑡 +  𝜀  
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Where β1 estimates the average level of support for welfare recipients among those 
individuals interviewed before the crisis (this becomes the constant). β2 estimates the 
difference between readers and non-readers in the average level of support for welfare 
recipients. β3 estimates the difference in the average level of support for welfare recipients for 
non-readers before-and-after the riots. Changes in this latter group reflect what would have 
happened had the readers been non-readers and includes other background trends. β4 is the 
coefficient of interest and estimates the change in the difference in the average level of 
support for welfare recipients between readers and non-readers after the riots. ε is the error 
term. 
 
To test our hypotheses we set up four intervention-control pairs. First, we compared all 
newspaper readers with all non-readers. Second, we compared only readers of right-leaning 
newspapers with all non-readers. Third, we compared readers of all left-leaning newspapers 
with all non-readers. Fourth, we compared those who read online news (predominantly the 
BBC news website) with other non-newspaper readers. This final contrast was intended to 
investigate the attitudinal effect of the riots on readers of a non-partisan news source. We use 
the BBC News website primarily because it is the largest online source of news in our sample 
that we can identify. After the BBC (n = 758), the next largest online news outlets in the BSA 
sample are Sky News (n = 92) and the Daily Mail (n = 85). During the riots the BBC News 
website received huge attention, with 10.9 million unique UK users on 9 August 2011 alone 
(Wilson, 24/07/13). Theoretically, the BBC also represents a useful comparison due to its 
strong stated emphasis on objectivity and neutrality.  
 
Previous research indicates that both education and party identification influence newspaper 
readership and attitudes toward welfare. Consequently, in the main models reported below we 
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adjust all our estimates for education and party identification. To test the robustness of our 
findings, we report the unadjusted findings (without controlling for education and party 
identification) and we report a fully adjusted model which controls for other key socio-
demographic confounders, including age, gender, marital status, social class, whether 
respondents watch television news, whether respondents read the news online, and their 
geographical region of residence. Adjusting for the impact of these other news sources, such 
as television and online is particularly important because they may also influence attitudes. 
Unfortunately we do not have data on radio news and so this is not included in the analysis. 
All analyses are weighted using the BSA population and design weights. 
 
Results 
Table 2 shows that, before the riots, there were no significant differences between newspaper 
readers and non-readers in their attitudes towards welfare recipients on any of the three 
measures. However, after the riots, attitudes diverged. Newspaper readers became more 
likely than non-readers to believe that those on welfare did not really deserve help, that the 
unemployed could find a job if they wanted to, and that those on the dole were being 
dishonest in claiming benefits. Common among studies of social attitudes, the R
2 
in these 
models is quite low, approximately ~0.05 (Cohen, 1977). Figure 1 shows that the source of 
this divergence is both an increase in negative attitudes among readers and a decrease in 
negative attitudes among non-readers.
1
 
 
                                                 
1
 There were no overall differences in welfare attitudes between the pre- and post-riots samples. Post-riots 
respondents were not more or less likely to believe welfare recipients deserved help (Difference in means = -
0.026, p = 0.55, n = 2160), whether they could find a job (Difference in means = 0.025, p = 0.58, n = 2161) or 
whether they were fiddling the dole (Difference in means = -0.008, p = 0.85, n= 2159) (Web Appendix 2). 
However, the difference-in-difference models revealed a substantial divergence in attitudes between newspaper 
readers and non-readers pre- and post-riots. 
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Our models show that the attitudes of newspaper readers and non-readers diverged by 
approximately 0.25 points following the riots (on a 5 point scale). Taking the whole scale into 
account, this is a fairly small effect. But, given that this divergence occurred over a relatively 
short period of time, it is surprisingly large. To put these effects into a more readily 
interpretable context we also re-estimated the models in table 2 using logistic regression 
models (1 = agree or strongly agree with statement; 0 = otherwise). Before the riots occurred, 
approximately 36% of readers and 36% of non-readers believed welfare recipients “don’t 
really deserve help”. After the riots, 41% of readers and 30% of non-readers believed the 
same statement. Similar results can be observed for the other two measures of support for 
welfare.  
 
 [Table 2 here] 
 [Figure 1 here] 
 
We also examined attitude differences for other groups of news consumers: those who only 
reported consuming print news, those who only reported consuming web news, those who 
reported consuming both web news and print news, and those who did not consume any of 
these forms of news. Only the print media readers diverged from the non-news consumers in 
terms of their attitudes towards welfare recipients over the riots (Web Appendix 3). Across 
this period web news consumers and non-consumers exhibited a non-significant decline in 
negative attitudes towards welfare recipients (Figure 2). Similar trends are observed for those 
who only consume TV news (Web Appendix 4). This suggests that the decrease in support 
for welfare recipients across this period among newspaper readers may be set against a 
background of generally increasing support in the rest of the population. 
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 [Figure 2 here] 
   
Having observed a significant divergence between all newspaper readers and non-readers, we 
subsequently examined the impact of the riots on readers of right and left wing papers 
separately. This distinction tests whether, as anticipated, the divergence between the print 
media and non-readers is concentrated among right-leaning newspapers rather than left-
leaning newspapers. Similar to the results shown in Table 2 for newspaper readers in general, 
Table 3 shows that before the riots there were no differences in attitudes between readers of 
right-leaning papers and those who did not read newspapers. After the riots, readers of right-
wing papers were more likely than non-newspaper readers to agree that welfare recipients 
didn’t really deserve help and that they could find a job if they really wanted to. They were 
also somewhat more likely to agree that most people on the dole were ‘fiddling’, but this 
difference was not statistically significant at the α = 0.05 level.  
 
Table 3 shows that the results for left-leaning newspaper readers were contrary to our 
expectations. The coefficients indicating the divergence of left-wing readers from non-
newspaper readers are in the same direction and are similar in size to those for right-wing 
readers. In fact, in the case of ‘could find a job’, the divergence for left-wing readers is 
actually somewhat larger (0.29 versus 0.26). This could constitute evidence against our 
preferred explanation for these results (an effect of media coverage focused on right-leaning 
newspapers). However, the sample of readers of left-leaning newspapers was extremely 
small, meaning that our estimates are highly uncertain.   
 
[Table 3 here] 
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Impact of the riots on alternative indicators of welfare support and other social attitudes  
The BSA includes other indicators of attitudes toward the welfare state and welfare recipients 
(Web Appendix 5). These measures are less focused on deservingness, and we therefore 
expected them to be less influenced by media coverage of the riots. As predicted, we did not 
observe any clear patterns of divergence on these alternative attitudinal measures. However, 
using the BSA’s welfarism scale, which is a cumulative measure incorporating all of the 
welfare attitude items, we observed that newspaper readers became less sympathetic towards 
welfare recipients than non-readers after the riots (Web Appendix 5).  
 
As a further check on our findings, we investigated the effect of the riots on attitudes towards 
non-welfare and non-riot related topics. If these attitudes also changed over the riots period, it 
would point towards an alternative explanation than an effect of the riots themselves. We 
replicated our primary analyses with four different attitudinal measures: 1) whether 
respondents agreed that big business primarily benefits the owners, 2) whether respondents 
agreed that there is one law for the rich and one law for the poor, 3) whether they agreed that 
censorship is necessary to uphold moral standards, and 4) whether they agreed that corporate 
management try to get the better of their employees (Web Appendix 6). Consistent with our 
predictions, there was no divergence in any of these variables before and after the riots in 
2011. 
 
Counterfactual analysis 
In the above analyses we assumed that the division of the BSA 2011 sample into pre- and 
post- riots observations was ‘as if random’. However, there may be systematic unmeasured 
differences between those who responded to the survey prior to August 6
th
, and those who 
responded between August 10
th
 and September 10
th
; for example a seasonality effect. To 
21 
 
check this possibility we therefore re-ran our analyses in three previous BSA waves for which 
the respondent interview date is publicly available; 2005, 2007, and 2008 (see Web Appendix 
Tables 7-12). In 2005 we found no evidence of a divergence in welfare attitudes between 
newspaper readers and non-readers across the ‘riots’ period. We also found qualitatively 
similar results for 2007 (Web Appendix Tables 9 and 10) and 2008 (Web Appendix Tables 
11 and 12). Taken together, the divergence in support for welfare recipients observed in 2011 
has not been observed in previous years. 
 
Sensitivity analyses 
We conducted a series of additional sensitivity tests to ensure our findings are consistent 
across different model specifications. We re-ran the analyses including all respondents 
interviewed after the 10
th
 of August in the post-riots sample. This did not qualitatively alter 
our results but the impact of the media on whether respondents believe welfare recipients are 
cheating the dole was attenuated slightly (p <0.1) (Web Appendix 13). Variation in the 
proportion of refusals or don’t knows across the study period could influence these findings 
but we find that this does not vary between the pre- and post-samples on any of the three 
primary welfare questions, e.g., those on benefits deserve help (p = 0.15). 
 
Many factors influence why people read particular newspapers and also their response to an 
event such as the riots. We therefore re-estimated our primary models, additionally adjusting 
for age, gender, marital status, social class, geographical region, whether respondents watch 
the news on TV, and whether respondents read the news online, finding that our results did 
not qualitatively change (Web Appendix 14). We also re-estimated our models removing all 
other covariates, i.e., without controlling for education or support for political party, and 
again found that our results did not change (Web Appendix 15).  
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Given our unexpected findings for left-leaning newspaper readers (see Table 3 and 
accompanying text), we decided to directly test the divergence between this group and right-
leaning newspaper readers using the same methods as previously.. Here, the models are 
inconclusive. The results are somewhat contrary to our expectation  that readers of right-
leaning newspapers would become less sympathetic to welfare recipients than readers of left-
leaning papers. We find that the coefficients are in the expected direction in three case but 
one of these is almost negligible (‘Dole cheating’) whereas two of them (Don’t really deserve 
help’ and ‘Support for the welfare state’) are comparable with the coefficients observed in 
table 3, which compare right-leaning readers and non-readers. Our results also suggest that 
readers of left-leaning papers became slightly more likely to believe that unemployed people 
could find a job if they want to. However, none of these differences were statistically 
significant at the α = 0.05 level, likely because this contrast is under-powered given the small 
number of left-leaning newspaper readers (see Web Appendix 16).  
 
The observed changes in welfare attitudes may be driven by an effect of the riots on 
respondents’ perceptions of threat. The riots, as a threatening event, may have made 
newspaper readers more fearful and mistrustful of others, with changes in their welfare 
support being a symptom of this broader effect (Kaariainen and Lehtonen, 2006). To test this 
possibility we examine whether there are changes in the level of social trust over this period. 
We find that after the riots there is no significant difference in the level of social trust 
between newspaper readers and non-readers (Difference-in-differences β = 0.07, p = 0.26).   
 
Finally, we considered the possibility that those with less interest in politics may be more 
uncertain in their attitudes towards welfare recipients, and therefore that they may be more 
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likely to change their views due to media reporting. First, we examined whether the 
politically interested and non-interested diverged in their attitudes toward welfare recipients 
across this period. We find no evidence of divergence on all three measures; deserve help (p 
= 0.91), find a job (p = 0.72), or ‘fiddling’ the dole (p = 0.47). 
 
Discussion 
The not-so-minimal effects of the media  
These findings contribute to a growing literature using design-based research (such as natural 
experiments) to estimate the effect of the media on political preferences and attitudes. 
Consistent with this literature on media effects, our results suggest that print media coverage 
of the riots increased negative attitudes toward welfare recipients.  
 
While growth in the number of outlets has fragmented the media market, this has not 
necessarily reduced the media’s impact on political attitudes. Especially in the United 
Kingdom, where the print media remains a highly centralized and important source of 
information regarding current affairs and political debate, the media’s persuasive power 
remains.  
 
Although the fragmentation of the mass media may undermine the impact of any particular 
news outlet, this diversification may also allow the media to increasingly mediate the way in 
which people perceive the social world. Mediatization refers to how the media actively 
shapes the political discourse (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999, Kepplinger, 2002). The media 
are not passive transmitters of information or facts. They frame, construct, and shape the 
information they receive (Stromback, 2008). Readers and viewers are then exposed to these 
messages and – as our results indicate – develop mediatized political attitudes based on this 
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narrative. For example, this mediatized political narrative influences whether people believe 
those receiving unemployment benefit are able to find a job or not regardless of whether  
there are jobs available. Additionally, the Department for Work and Pensions’ estimates of 
the extent of benefit fraud have been below 5% since 2004 and yet after the riots newspapers 
readers, compared with non-readers, became more likely to believe that ‘most people on the 
dole are fiddling one way or another’. These fluctuations do not reflect an objective reality 
but rather reflect the capacity of the news media to create a narrative through which the social 
realities of unemployment, social welfare, and the economy are understood. 
 
This sudden shift in attitudes toward welfare recipients in 2011 must be set against a 
backdrop of increased negativity in media coverage of welfare in the UK over the last 20 
years. The extent of coverage has not radically increased but the tone became noticeably 
more negative around 2010 (Baumberg et al., 2012). Given this trend, could coverage of a 
single event influence attitudes? Certainly the riots were only one event, but they were a 
uniquely large and conspicuous event in recent UK history, receiving blanket and continuous 
coverage while dominating the national conversation for a substantial period. Our results 
suggest this did indeed have a measurable effect on welfare attitudes among newspaper 
readers while analysis of previous years showed no similar effects.  
 
The controversy regarding media effects has been difficult to resolve because capturing the 
influence of the mass media is challenging (Brynin and Newton, 2003, Ladd and Lenz, 2009). 
Design-based research has been able to address some of these challenges while consistently 
providing evidence of the continued impact of the media on partisanship and political 
attitudes, suggesting the process of mediatization shapes perceptions of the social world. 
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The persuasive power of the media 
What is less clear from these findings is the mechanism by which readers alter their 
perceptions of the social world. Two main possible mechanisms have been suggested in the 
literature. First, political attitudes may be derived from social group membership (Green et 
al., 2002). In making decisions about political attitudes, Green et al. argue that people 
consider the different social groups which they believe align (or not) with different attitudes. 
They then ask themselves whether they are a member of that group. The implication is that if 
a person views themselves as a Daily Mail reader, and the Daily Mail argues that rioters are 
predominantly benefit claimants who do not deserve help, then they will be more likely to 
support this position.  
 
Alternatively, persuasion may affect readers because beliefs change. By this view, Daily Mail 
readers (for example) are (semi-)rational actors who adopt new beliefs based on the evidence 
presented to them (DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010). Although decisions about beliefs often 
rest on imperfect memories, double-counting repeated information, and other forms of 
judgment errors, they still reflect changes in belief based on information that is 
communicated from a sender to a receiver. In this view, persuasion should be more effective 
when recipients are more uncertain about the truth and yet we do not find unqualified support 
for this mechanism.   
 
The apparent effect of print media coverage of the riots on attitudes toward welfare was 
clearest for readers of right-leaning papers. However, we were unable to statistically 
distinguish the between readers of left and right-wing papers in terms of these effects (see 
Table 3 and Web Appendix 16). In fact, in some cases the coefficients suggested a slightly 
larger negative media effect among left-wing readers. Broadly, there are two possible 
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explanations for these results. First, our sample of left-wing newspaper readers was very 
small, and our estimates of the media effect for this group are consequently highly uncertain. 
It is possible that, given a sufficiently large sample of left-wing newspaper readers, we would 
observe that their attitudes were indeed less negatively affected by media coverage of the 
riots than were readers of right-wing papers. Alternatively, the results may reflect a genuine 
similarity in the effects for both left and right-wing print media consumers. This would be 
difficult to explain on the basis of the content of the media coverage, and would therefore 
likely point to an alternative explanation for our findings. 
 
In contrast to the right-leaning papers, non-readers became more sympathetic toward welfare 
recipients. This increase in sympathy is consistent with the non-print media coverage, e.g., 
BBC Online News (which, as noted above, is likely to also represent the tone of the coverage 
of BBC television news), suggesting that media coverage from these sources also influenced 
attitudes. If interest in politics does not explain these findings, are they driven by group 
identification? While Daily Mail readers might view themselves as part of a group of like-
minded individuals, it might be surprising to find that BBC Online News readers would view 
themselves in the same way. In fact, television and radio news content may not evoke the 
same degree of group identity potentially associated with the print media. In short, while 
there are no clear theoretical reasons why partisan media of any ideology (or even neutral 
media) would not have similar effects on readers,  more research is needed to understand the 
mechanisms through which newspapers and other forms of media, such as television and 
radio, may influence attitudes.  
 
Democracy and ideological diversity 
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Although developing a detailed model of the role of the media in democracies is beyond the 
scope of this paper, these results do raise some questions about this relationship, particularly 
around the issue of media ownership. Faced with the rise of the mass media, many 
governments have implemented regulation to restrict the concentration of power in media 
markets. Two ideas underline why governments have regulated media ownership. First, 
media markets that are not regulated will tend to produce ideological homogeneity. Second, 
this homogeneity will influence citizens. Based on these two ideas, governments regulate 
media markets in an effort to create ideological diversity, which is assumed to enable citizens 
to make more informed political decisions (Baker, 2007). 
 
But are unregulated markets more likely foster ideological homogeneity? If newspapers 
reflect rather than create public opinion then ideological homogeneity may be driven by the 
public rather than owners of media outlets. For example, if the public is already ideologically 
homogenous then a newspaper may seek to maximize profits and secure a larger market share 
by bringing their ideology in line with that of the public. By this view, the impact of owners 
on shaping content is considered to be minimal (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010). Evidence 
supporting this process mostly comes from the US where the majority of newspapers serve 
relatively local markets. This is problematic because newspapers tend to be less partisan in 
more localized markets where they need to appeal to a larger proportion of the community 
(Dalton et al., 1998). Yet, even in the US, newspaper owners shape content to reflect their 
own preferences. Ownership influences the extent of election coverage around particular 
issues (Dunaway, 2008) as well as the slant of the coverage on those same issues (Gilens and 
Hertzman, 2000). The UK is no exception. Two of the largest national newspapers are owned 
by Rupert Murdoch, who is unabashed about the influence of his right-wing political views 
on the content of his newspapers.  
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Regulation has often been used to minimise the ideological homogeneity created by 
ownership. In the UK, for example, radio and TV are legally bound to present balanced 
political news coverage and to limit political editorializing (Brynin and Newton, 2003). We 
found that consumers of these media sources (television news and the online news service 
provided by the BBC – which is primarily a broadcast service) were not affected by the riots 
in the same way as were readers of the highly partisan print media. The partisan print media 
seems to affect consumers in ways that are distinct from the regulated broadcast media; 
suggesting that more diversity among the print media may influence political attitudes in the 
population.  
 
Recent trends in public policy have weakened safeguards intended to prevent the 
consolidation of media ownership, which may reduce diversity among the print media. Since 
the 1990s both the Conservative and the Labour party have issued policy statements which 
stress the importance of ideological pluralism and diversity for democracy (Department of 
National Heritage, 1995, Department of Media Culture and Sport (DMCS), 2001). Yet, these 
statements have been concurrent with policy changes which allow increased consolidation of 
media ownership.  
 
Of course, these issues not only apply to the relationship between welfare and social 
protection but also have implications for other policy domains, such as the environment. 
Gavin and colleagues have examined the mediatisation of climate change in the UK and 
beyond (Gavin and Marshall, 2011). They argue that the media’s coverage of these issues is 
both agenda-setting and communicating important information but this coverage has, at 
times, been too heavily influenced by climate change sceptics (Gavin et al., 2011). As a 
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result, people may have become more confused about climate change (Gavin and Marshall, 
2011). Bringing these two research streams together has a number of implications. First, it 
raises questions regarding the role of the media in fostering (or hindering) public debate. For 
example, it may give the impression that there is a climate change debate when there is not or 
it may give the impression that welfare fraud is common when it is not. Second, it highlights 
the role of vested interests in these political debates. Here the issue of ownership is again 
highly salient but more research is required, inside and outside the US, regarding whether 
ownership influences content and on what specific issues. This cross-national approach is 
critical because there is likely to be variation across contexts in whether climate change 
scepticism is associated with political ideology and therefore whether it would influence 
content.  
 
Taken together, these examples highlight that the role of the media in democracies requires 
more sustained engagement across a range of topics, including welfare, climate change and 
others. Results from this study suggest media coverage can influence public attitudes towards 
vulnerable groups. Given this association, the implications of increasing consolidation of 
media ownership, and the consequent ideological homogeneity of media content, requires 
further debate. 
 
Limitations 
Our study has several important limitations. First, because we relied on a within-sample 
contrast between those interviewed for the BSA before the riots and those interviewed 
afterward, we were unable to estimate attitude change within individuals over time. A second 
concern is that the pre- and post-riots split in the sample was not ‘as-if’ random and that 
unobserved differences between the samples may remain, e.g., regional differences. While we 
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cannot rule this out entirely, we do not find significant difference between these samples on a 
range of socio-demographic indicators, offering some support for this assumption. Third, 
people often select the news media they consume based on pre-existing preferences, which 
may reflect their increased susceptibility to arguments about the deservingness of welfare 
recipients. Not only did we fail to find significant differences between readers and non-
readers before the riots but our findings were not explained by party identification – a useful 
proxy for existing preferences. Fourth, it is impossible to disaggregate the effect of the riots 
themselves on attitudes, separate from the media effects. This is because media effects spill-
over and influence those who may not consume the mass media. In other words, there is no 
clear intervention and control group because those who ‘read a newspaper’ are still friends 
with and talk to those who are not. A final limitation of this study is that we were not able to 
capture the long-term effects of the riots on attitudes towards welfare recipients. 
Nevertheless, we were able to show that an effect persisted some weeks and even months 
after the riots had ended. Although these effects may not reflect permanent attitudinal change, 
they are not necessarily short-lived.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The 2011 riots raised the profile of issues related to the deservingness of welfare recipients. 
Our findings suggest that media coverage of this event was able to significantly affect 
attitudes towards this group over the short-term. Specifically, those exposed to print media 
(but not those exposed to broadcast or web news) diverged significantly from the rest of the 
population in terms of their negative attitudes towards welfare recipients.  
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These findings have implications for future policy debates. Attitude divergence in the short-
term was observed among those consuming the highly partisan print media (although, as 
noted above, we were unable to clearly differentiate between readers of right- and left-leaning 
newspapers). Highly partisan print media appears to influence consumer’s beliefs about the 
social world in ways that are distinct from non-partisan consumers (such as the television 
news or the online news service provided by the BBC), suggesting that the regulatory 
requirement of ideological neutrality of the TV media and the BBC may have consequences 
for political attitudes in the UK. These results should prompt further debate concerning how 
media influences attitudes and whether media partisanship coupled with highly centralized 
ownership is a public concern.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1: Attitudes towards welfare recipients before and after the riots, by newspaper 
readership 
 
Figure 2:  Attitudes towards welfare recipients before and after the riots, by web news 
readership 
 
Table 1: As-if randomization tests for pre- and post-riots samples 
 
Table 2: Effect of newspaper readership on attitudes toward welfare recipients before and 
after the riots, from linear difference-in-difference models 
 
Table 3: Effect of partisan newspaper readership on attitudes toward welfare recipients before 
and after the riots, from linear difference-in-difference models 
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Figure 1: Attitudes towards welfare recipients before and after the riots, by newspaper 
readership 
 
Notes: Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals.  
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Figure 2: Attitudes towards welfare recipients before and after the riots, by web news 
readership 
 
Notes: Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 1: As-if randomization tests for pre- and post-riots samples  
 
Pre-riots 
(n = 1035) 
Post-riots 
(n = 1035) Difference  
Variable 
Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Pre-riots- 
Post-riots 
(Std. Error) p-value 
Gender (Female = 1) 
55.7% 
(1.55) 
54.2% 
(1.55) 
1.45% 
(2.19) 
0.51 
Age 
52.2 
(0.55) 
51.0 
(0.54) 
1.24 
(0.77) 
0.11 
Post-secondary education 
44.6% 
(1.55) 
47.5% 
(1.55) 
-2.90% 
(2.19) 
0.19 
Support for Conservative party 
32.8% 
(1.46) 
29.8% 
(1.42) 
3.00% 
(2.04) 
0.14 
Read a newspaper 
41.4% 
(1.53) 
41.3% 
(1.53) 
0.097% 
(2.17) 
0.96 
Married 
57.7% 
(1.54) 
57.7% 
(1.54) 
0.01% 
(2.17) 
0.99 
Professional service class 
38.4% 
(1.51) 
40.2% 
(1.52) 
-1.84% 
(2.14) 
0.39 
Watch TV News daily 
76.0% 
(2.64) 
78.3% 
(2.53) 
-2.22% 
(3.66) 
0.54 
Children in household 
66.2% 
(1.47) 
66.4% 
(1.47) 
-0.19% 
(2.18) 
0.93 
Notes: p-value is calculated using two-tailed t-test assuming unequal variances.  
<0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 2: Effect (β coefficients) of newspaper readership on attitudes toward welfare 
recipients before and after the riots, from linear difference-in-difference models 
 Don’t really 
deserve help
1 
Could find a 
job
2 
Dole 
cheating
3 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Change in the difference between readers 
and non-readers after the riots 
0.27
**
 
(0.093) 
0.24
*
 
(0.099) 
0.24
*
 
(0.097) 
    
Difference between readers and non-readers 
before the riots 
-0.042 
(0.067) 
-0.060 
(0.069) 
-0.090 
(0.070) 
    
Change in attitudes among non-readers 
before-and-after riots 
-0.14
*
 
(0.061) 
-0.11 
(0.067) 
-0.099 
(0.062) 
    
Constant 3.55
**
 
(0.067) 
3.62
**
 
(0.074) 
3.51
**
 
(0.072) 
    
Observations 2124 2125 2123 
R
2
 0.068 0.041 0.068 
Notes: All models are weighted. Constant is reported as Pre-riots non-newspaper reader. Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01. All models adjusted for education and political affiliation. 
1 – Many people who get social security don't really deserve any help? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
2 – Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 
Agree strongly] 
3 – Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
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Table 3: Effect (β coefficients) of partisan newspaper readership on attitudes toward welfare 
recipients before and after the riots, from linear difference-in-difference models 
 Don’t really 
deserve help
1 
Could find 
a job
2 
Dole 
cheating
3 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Right-wing papers    
Change in the difference between readers and 
non-newspaper readers after the riots 
0.31
**
 
(0.11) 
0.26
*
 
(0.12) 
0.23 
(0.12) 
    
Difference between readers and non-
newspaper readers before the riots 
-0.027 
(0.080) 
-0.059 
(0.087) 
-0.081 
(0.090) 
    
Change in attitudes among non-newspaper 
readers before-and-after riots 
-0.15
*
 
(0.071) 
-0.13 
(0.078) 
-0.11 
(0.072) 
    
Constant 3.52
**
 
(0.076) 
3.61
**
 
(0.085) 
3.51
**
 
(0.082) 
    
Observations 1504 1505 1504 
R
2
 0.065 0.034 0.059 
    
Left-wing papers    
Change in the difference between readers and 
non-newspaper readers after the riots 
0.090 
(0.21) 
0.29 
(0.22) 
0.19 
(0.23) 
    
Difference between readers and non-
newspaper readers before the riots 
-0.19 
(0.14) 
-0.16 
(0.14) 
-0.28 
(0.15) 
    
Change in attitudes among non-newspaper 
readers before-and-after riots 
-0.15
*
 
(0.071) 
-0.13 
(0.077) 
-0.11 
(0.072) 
    
Constant 3.50
**
 
(0.087) 
3.60
**
 
(0.098) 
3.50
**
 
(0.092) 
    
Observations 1104 1106 1104 
R
2
 0.050 0.069 0.069 
Notes: All models are weighted. Constant is reported as Pre-riots. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p 
< 0.01. All models adjust for education and political affiliation. We also exclude those non-readers who use 
online news pages and those who read both online and print media. 
1 – Many people who get social security don't really deserve any help? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
2 – Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 
Agree strongly] 
3 – Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
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Web Appendix 16: Effect (β coefficients) of the ideology of newspaper readership on 
attitudes toward welfare recipients before and after the riots, from linear difference-in-
difference models 
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Web Appendix 1: Description of the method for analysing content of print and online media 
For the print media sources we searched the Lexis Nexis news database for the period August 
6
th
 – Sep 10th (the week of the riots and the month following) for any article published in the 
relevant sources which included “riots” as an index term, and which also included this term at 
the start of the article (using the Lexis Nexis option to exclude duplicates based on moderate 
similarity). We manually excluded articles in which the riots were not the primary topic – for 
example, celebrity interviews where the riots were mentioned. This left 893 articles across 
the four newspapers which directly addressed the riots. Within this group we then identified 
109 articles which additionally included a reference to welfare benefits (12% of the total 
coverage of the riots in these newspapers). Examining the sources separately, we found that 
9% of Guardian/Observer and 18% of Daily Mail/MoS articles on the riots made a 
connection to welfare. 
Articles published on the BBC News website are not systematically archived on the Lexis 
Nexis newspaper database. We therefore searched the BBC News online archive directly 
using the same terms and exclusion criteria (additionally excluding articles which were 
primarily advertisements for upcoming BBC broadcast programs, or invitations to participate 
in interactive activities like webchats. Only 4% of BBC News articles on the riots made the 
link to welfare. 
We subsequently manually coded articles linking the riots to welfare into the following three 
categories: 
1. Positive - Articles were coded as positive if they primarily made arguments 
supportive of welfare benefit claimants or the welfare system – for example, that 
welfare benefit claimants are genuinely in need of help. An example of a positive 
article from the Guardian described the proposal to remove benefits from convicted 
rioters as “fundamentally wrongheaded” (Comment is Free, 29/8/11). 
2. Negative – Articles were coded as negative if they primary made arguments critical of 
welfare recipients or the welfare system; for example arguing that welfare recipients 
are undeserving, or that benefits dependency was one of the primary causes of the 
riots. An example of a negative article from The Daily Mail cited “welfare handouts” 
as one of the factors leading to the behaviour of the “young thugs” (Shipman, 
11/8/11). 
3. Neutral – Articles were coded as neutral if a balanced view of different sides of the 
debate was presented (for example, where equal space was given to quotes from 
supportive and critical organisations), or where an event such as a policy 
announcement was presented without commentary. An example of a neutral article 
from the Guardian described the government’s proposal to dock benefits for 
convicted rioters without positive or negative commentary.(Wintour, 7/09/11). 
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Web Appendix 2: Change in attitudes toward welfare recipients before-and-after the riots 
Variable 
Pre-riots 
Mean 
(Std. Err.) 
Post-riots 
Mean 
(Std. Err.) 
Difference 
(Post-Riots – Pre-riots) N p-value 
Don’t really deserve help1 3.11 
(0.03) 
3.09 
(0.03) 
-0.026 2160 0.55 
Could find a job
2
 3.46 
(0.03) 
3.48 
(0.03) 
0.025 2161 0.58 
Dole cheating
3
 3.13 
(0.03) 
3.12 
(0.03) 
-0.008 2159 0.85 
      
Notes: Pre-riots includes those interviewed before August 6
th
 2011. Post-riots sample includes those who were 
interviewed after August 10
th
 2011 and before September 10
th
 2011. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 
p < 0.01 
1 – Many people who get social security don't really deserve any help? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly]  
2 – Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 
Agree strongly] 
3 – Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
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Web Appendix 3: Effect of media consumption on attitudes toward welfare recipients 
 Don’t really 
deserve help
1 
Could find 
a job
2 
Dole 
cheating
3 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Change in the difference between newspaper 
readers only and non-readers after the riots 
0.28
**
 
(0.10) 
0.25
*
 
(0.11) 
0.23
*
 
(0.11) 
    
Change in the difference between web-based 
news readers and non-readers after the riots 
0.068 
(0.14) 
0.14 
(0.15) 
0.049 
(0.14) 
    
Change in the difference between Newspaper 
and web-based news readers and non-readers 
after the riots 
0.29 
(0.19) 
0.32 
(0.18) 
0.34 
(0.18) 
    
Difference between newspaper readers only and 
non-readers before the riots 
-0.066 
(0.074) 
-0.10 
(0.077) 
-0.13 
(0.078) 
    
Difference between web-based only and non-
readers before the riots 
-0.019 
(0.10) 
0.038 
(0.11) 
-0.12 
(0.10) 
    
Difference between Newspaper and web-based 
news readers and non-readers before the riots 
0.030 
(0.14) 
0.14 
(0.13) 
-0.064 
(0.13) 
    
Change in attitudes among non-readers before-
and-after riots 
-0.15
*
 
(0.071) 
-0.14 
(0.078) 
-0.11 
(0.072) 
    
Constant 3.57
**
 
(0.071) 
3.66
**
 
(0.078) 
3.55
**
 
(0.075) 
    
Observations 2124 2125 2123 
R
2
 0.069 0.046 0.070 
Notes: All models are weighted. Pre-riots includes those interviewed before August 6
th
 2011. Post-riots sample 
includes those who were interviewed after August 10
th
 2011 and before September 10
th
 2011. Constant is 
reported as Pre-riots non-news readers (Web or Print). Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01. All 
models adjust for education and political affiliation. 
1 – Many people who get social security don't really deserve any help? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
2 – Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 
Agree strongly] 
3 – Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
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Web Appendix 4: Attitudes towards welfare recipients before and after the riots, by TV news 
consumption 
 
Notes: Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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Web Appendix 5: Effect of newspaper readership on attitudes toward the welfare state before and after the riots, from difference-in-difference 
models 
 Proud of 
Welfare 
state
1 
Welfare state stops 
people from 
standing on own
2 
Reducing welfare 
would damage too 
many peoples lives
3 
Welfare encourages 
people to stop helping 
each other
4 
Spend more 
on the 
poor
5 
Support for 
Welfare 
state
6 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Change in the difference 
between readers and non-
readers after the riots 
-0.096 
(0.11) 
0.18 
(0.11) 
-0.027 
(0.10) 
0.17 
(0.100) 
-0.067 
(0.11) 
-0.16
*
 
(0.067) 
       
Difference between readers 
and non-readers before the 
riots 
0.26
**
 
(0.079) 
-0.000071 
(0.079) 
-0.034 
(0.077) 
-0.032 
(0.072) 
0.069 
(0.074) 
0.081 
(0.047) 
       
Change in attitudes among 
non-readers before-and-after 
riots 
0.071 
(0.070) 
-0.089 
(0.075) 
0.041 
(0.067) 
-0.077 
(0.062) 
0.027 
(0.067) 
0.086
*
 
(0.043) 
       
Constant 3.54
**
 
(0.078) 
3.89
**
 
(0.078) 
3.11
**
 
(0.073) 
3.37
**
 
(0.070) 
2.79
**
 
(0.074) 
2.68
**
 
(0.048) 
       
Observations 1692 1691 1692 1687 1689 1694 
R
2
 0.074 0.075 0.056 0.051 0.072 0.093 
Notes: All models are weighted. Pre-riots includes those interviewed before August 6
th
 2011. Post-riots sample includes those who were interviewed after August 10
th
 2011 
and before September 10
th
 2011. Constant is reported as Pre-riots non-newspaper reader. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01. All models adjust for 
education and political affiliation. We also exclude those non-readers who use online news pages and those who read both online and print media. 
1 – The creation of the welfare state is one of Britain's proudest achievements? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
2 – If welfare benefits weren't so generous, people would learn to stand on own feet? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
3 – Cutting benefits would damage too many people's lives? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
4 - The welfare state encourages people to stop helping each other? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
5 - The government should spend more money on welfare benefits for the poor? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
6 – Welfarism scale [1 – poor do not deserve help, 5 –Sympathetic to welfare state]. Combined and scaled measure of the following variables of the other 5 variables included 
in this table and the three main indicators used in the analysis: Welfare recipients don’t really deserve help, could find a job, and they cheat on the dole. 
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Web Appendix 6: Effect of newspaper readership on other political attitudes with before and 
after the riots, from difference-in-difference models 
 Big 
business 
benefits 
owners
1 
One law for 
Rich and 
one law for 
poor
2 
Censorship is 
necessary to 
uphold moral 
standards
3 
Management try 
to get better of 
employees
4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Change in the 
difference between 
readers and non-
readers after the riots 
-0.063 
(0.10) 
0.083 
(0.11) 
-0.095 
(0.11) 
0.065 
(0.10) 
     
Difference between 
readers and non-
readers before the riots 
-0.13 
(0.072) 
-0.15 
(0.078) 
0.054 
(0.088) 
-0.057 
(0.076) 
     
Change in attitudes 
among non-readers 
before-and-after riots 
0.098 
(0.067) 
0.036 
(0.075) 
-0.035 
(0.073) 
0.064 
(0.069) 
     
Constant 2.71
**
 
(0.074) 
2.52
**
 
(0.080) 
1.98
**
 
(0.074) 
2.42
**
 
(0.075) 
     
Observations 1682 1690 1698 1693 
R
2
 0.040 0.088 0.056 0.072 
Notes: All models are weighted. Pre-riots includes those interviewed before August 6
th
 2011. Post-riots sample 
includes those who were interviewed after August 10
th
 2011 and before September 10
th
 2011. Constant is 
reported as Pre-riots non-newspaper reader. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01. All models 
adjust for education and political affiliation. We also exclude those non-readers who use online news pages and 
those who read both online and print media. 
1 – Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
2 – There is one law for the rich and one for the poor? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
3 – Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree 
strongly] 
4 - Management will always try to get the better of employees if gets chance? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree 
strongly] 
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Web Appendix 7: Effect of newspaper readership on attitudes toward welfare recipients 
before and after ‘riots’ period in 2005, from difference-in-difference models 
 Don’t really 
deserve help
1 
Could find a 
job
2 
Dole 
cheating
3 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Change in the difference between readers 
and non-readers after riots period 
-0.096 
(0.12) 
-0.013 
(0.10) 
-0.026 
(0.12) 
    
Difference between readers and non-readers 
before the riots period 
0.046 
(0.057) 
0.029 
(0.051) 
0.058 
(0.059) 
    
Change in attitudes among non-readers 
before-and-after riots period 
-0.069 
(0.084) 
-0.026 
(0.074) 
-0.055 
(0.084) 
    
Constant 3.20
**
 
(0.040) 
3.74
**
 
(0.036) 
3.15
**
 
(0.041) 
    
Observations 1915 1918 1913 
R
2
 0.0033 0.00046 0.0015 
Notes: All models are weighted. Pre-riots period includes those interviewed before August 6
th
 2005. Post-riots 
period includes those who were interviewed after August 10
th
 2005 and before September 10
th
 2005. Constant is 
reported as Pre-‘riots’ non-newspaper reader. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
1 – Many people who get social security don't really deserve any help? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
2 – Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 
Agree strongly] 
3 – Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly]  
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Web Appendix 8: Effect of partisan newspaper readership on attitudes toward welfare 
recipients before and after the riots period in 2005, from difference-in-difference models 
 Don’t really 
deserve help
1 
Could find 
a job
2 
Dole 
cheating
3 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Right-wing papers    
Change in the difference between readers 
and non-readers after riots period 
-0.17 
(0.12) 
-0.094 
(0.11) 
-0.15 
(0.13) 
    
Difference between readers and non-readers 
before riots period 
0.13
*
 
(0.062) 
0.12
*
 
(0.054) 
0.17
**
 
(0.063) 
    
Change in attitudes among non-readers 
before-and-after riots period 
-0.069 
(0.084) 
-0.026 
(0.074) 
-0.055 
(0.084) 
    
Constant 3.20
**
 
(0.040) 
3.74
**
 
(0.036) 
3.15
**
 
(0.041) 
    
Observations 1633 1635 1634 
R
2
 0.0069 0.0042 0.0075 
    
Left-wing papers    
Change in the difference between readers 
and non-readers after riots period 
0.10 
(0.21) 
0.063 
(0.19) 
0.30 
(0.21) 
    
Difference between readers and non-readers 
before riots period 
-0.21 
(0.11) 
-0.18 
(0.098) 
-0.25
*
 
(0.11) 
    
Change in attitudes among non-readers 
before-and-after riots period 
-0.069 
(0.084) 
-0.026 
(0.074) 
-0.055 
(0.084) 
    
Constant 3.20
**
 
(0.040) 
3.74
**
 
(0.036) 
3.15
**
 
(0.041) 
    
Observations 1146 1149 1146 
R
2
 0.0053 0.0048 0.0059 
Notes: All models are weighted. Pre-riots period includes those interviewed before August 6
th
 2005. Post-riots 
period includes those who were interviewed after August 10
th
 2005 and before September 10
th
 2005. Constant is 
reported as Pre-‘riots’. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. All models adjust for education 
and political affiliation. We also exclude those non-readers who use online news pages and those who read both 
online and print media. 
1 – Many people who get social security don't really deserve any help? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
2 – Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 
Agree strongly] 
3 – Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
  
50 
 
Web Appendix 9: Effect of newspaper readership on attitudes toward welfare recipients 
before and after riots period in 2007, from difference-in-difference models 
 Don’t really 
deserve help
1 
Could find 
a job
2 
Dole 
cheating
3 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Change in the difference between readers 
and non-readers after riots period 
0.0063 
(0.11) 
-0.041 
(0.10) 
0.10 
(0.11) 
    
Difference between readers and non-readers 
before riots period 
0.10 
(0.069) 
0.12 
(0.066) 
0.061 
(0.069) 
    
Change in attitudes among non-readers 
before-and-after riots period 
0.067 
(0.078) 
0.080 
(0.071) 
-0.024 
(0.075) 
    
Constant 2.97
**
 
(0.049) 
2.40
**
 
(0.047) 
2.86
**
 
(0.046) 
    
Observations 1686 1688 1666 
R
2
 0.0041 0.0041 0.0034 
Notes: All models are weighted. Pre-riots period includes those interviewed before August 6
th
 2007. Post-riots 
period includes those who were interviewed after August 10
th
 2007 and before September 10
th
 2007. Constant is 
reported as Pre-riots non-newspaper reader. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01 
1 – Many people who get social security don't really deserve any help? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
2 – Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 
Agree strongly] 
3 – Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly]  
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Web Appendix 10: Effect of partisan newspaper readership on attitudes toward welfare 
recipients before and after the riots period in 2007, from difference-in-difference models 
 Don’t really 
deserve help
1 
Could find 
a job
2 
Dole 
cheating
3 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Right-wing papers    
Change in the difference between readers 
and non-readers after riots period 
0.043 
(0.14) 
0.12 
(0.12) 
-0.085 
(0.14) 
    
Difference between readers and non-readers 
before riots period 
-0.17
*
 
(0.087) 
-0.16
*
 
(0.078) 
-0.024 
(0.086) 
    
Change in attitudes among non-readers 
before-and-after riots period 
-0.055 
(0.077) 
-0.074 
(0.069) 
0.035 
(0.072) 
    
Constant 2.63
**
 
(0.079) 
2.23
**
 
(0.071) 
2.57
**
 
(0.079) 
    
Observations 1240 1240 1224 
R
2
 0.057 0.025 0.080 
    
Left-wing papers    
Change in the difference between readers 
and non-readers after riots period 
-0.21 
(0.15) 
-0.073 
(0.13) 
-0.19 
(0.14) 
    
Difference between readers and non-readers 
before riots period 
0.066 
(0.093) 
-0.097 
(0.094) 
-0.073 
(0.095) 
    
Change in attitudes among non-readers 
before-and-after riots period 
-0.045 
(0.077) 
-0.065 
(0.070) 
0.037 
(0.072) 
    
Constant 2.50
**
 
(0.081) 
2.19
**
 
(0.078) 
2.48
**
 
(0.081) 
    
Observations 1219 1220 1207 
R
2
 0.071 0.034 0.11 
Notes: All models are weighted. Pre-riots period includes those interviewed before August 6
th
 2007. Post-riots 
period includes those who were interviewed after August 10
th
 2007 and before September 10
th
 2007. Constant is 
reported as Pre-riots. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01. All models adjust for education and 
political affiliation. We also exclude those non-readers who use online news pages and those who read both 
online and print media. 
1 – Many people who get social security don't really deserve any help? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
2 – Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 
Agree strongly] 
3 – Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
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Web Appendix 11: Effect of newspaper readership on attitudes toward welfare recipients 
before and after riots period in 2008, from difference-in-difference models 
 Don’t really 
deserve help
1 
Could find a 
job
2 
Dole 
cheating
3 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Change in the difference between readers 
and non-readers after riots period 
-0.15 
(0.10) 
-0.12 
(0.10) 
-0.080 
(0.11) 
    
Difference between readers and non-readers 
before riots period 
0.078 
(0.048) 
-0.00048 
(0.044) 
0.015 
(0.047) 
    
Change in attitudes among non-readers 
before-and-after riots period 
0.025 
(0.070) 
-0.025 
(0.068) 
-0.0091 
(0.072) 
    
Constant 3.13
**
 
(0.033) 
3.77
**
 
(0.030) 
3.16
**
 
(0.032) 
    
Observations 2504 2515 2502 
R
2
 0.0019 0.0024 0.00066 
Notes: All models are weighted. Pre-riots period includes those interviewed before August 6
th
 2008. Post-riots 
period includes those who were interviewed after August 10
th
 2008 and before September 10
th
 2008. Constant is 
reported as Pre-riots non-newspaper reader. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01. All models 
adjust for education and political affiliation. We also exclude those non-readers who use online news pages and 
those who read both online and print media. 
1 – Many people who get social security don't really deserve any help? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
2 – Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 
Agree strongly] 
3 – Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
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Web Appendix 12: Effect of partisan newspaper readership on attitudes toward welfare 
recipients before and after the riots period in 2008, from difference-in-difference models 
 Don’t really 
deserve help
1 
Could find 
a job
2 
Dole 
cheating
3 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Right-wing papers    
Change in the difference between readers 
and non-readers after riots period 
-0.13 
(0.12) 
-0.12 
(0.11) 
-0.059 
(0.12) 
    
Difference between readers and non-readers 
before riots period 
0.15
**
 
(0.053) 
0.069 
(0.048) 
0.078 
(0.052) 
    
Change in attitudes among non-readers 
before-and-after riots period 
0.025 
(0.070) 
-0.025 
(0.068) 
-0.0091 
(0.072) 
    
Constant 3.13
**
 
(0.033) 
3.77
**
 
(0.030) 
3.16
**
 
(0.032) 
    
Observations 2167 2176 2164 
R
2
 0.0042 0.0022 0.0014 
    
Left-wing papers    
Change in the difference between readers 
and non-readers after riots period 
-0.14 
(0.20) 
-0.19 
(0.19) 
-0.27 
(0.20) 
    
Difference between readers and non-readers 
before riots period 
-0.16 
(0.094) 
-0.16 
(0.089) 
-0.16 
(0.093) 
    
Change in attitudes among non-readers 
before-and-after riots period 
0.025 
(0.070) 
-0.025 
(0.068) 
-0.0091 
(0.072) 
    
Constant 3.13
**
 
(0.033) 
3.77
**
 
(0.030) 
3.16
**
 
(0.032) 
    
Observations 1599 1603 1595 
R
2
 0.0044 0.0063 0.0069 
Notes: All models are weighted. Pre-riots period includes those interviewed before August 6
th
 2008. Post-riots 
period includes those who were interviewed after August 10
th
 2008 and before September 10
th
 2008. Constant is 
reported as Pre-riots. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01. All models adjust for education and 
political affiliation. We also exclude those non-readers who use online news pages and those who read both 
online and print media. 
1 – Many people who get social security don't really deserve any help? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
2 – Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 
Agree strongly] 
3 – Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
 
54 
 
Web Appendix 13: Effect of newspaper readership on attitudes toward welfare recipients 
including those interviewed after September 10
th
 2011 
 Don’t really 
deserve help
1 
Could find 
a job
2 
Dole 
cheating
3 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Change in the difference between readers 
and non-readers after the riots 
0.19
*
 
(0.088) 
0.20
*
 
(0.092) 
0.14 
(0.091) 
    
Difference between readers and non-readers 
before the riots 
0.0015 
(0.067) 
-0.069 
(0.069) 
-0.071 
(0.070) 
    
Change in attitudes among non-readers 
before-and-after riots 
-0.096 
(0.057) 
-0.073 
(0.062) 
-0.061 
(0.058) 
    
Constant 3.11
**
 
(0.044) 
3.52
**
 
(0.047) 
3.17
**
 
(0.044) 
    
Observations 2557 2555 2555 
R
2
 0.0051 0.0027 0.0011 
Notes: All models are weighted. Pre-riots includes those interviewed before August 6
th
 2011. Post-riots sample 
includes those who were interviewed between August 10
th
 2011 and the end of the data collection in October 
2011. Constant is reported as Pre-riots non-newspaper reader. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 
0.01 
1 – Many people who get social security don't really deserve any help? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
2 – Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 
Agree strongly] 
3 – Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
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Web Appendix 14: Effect of newspaper readership on attitudes toward welfare recipients before and after the riots, adjusted for socio-
demographic variables 
 Many people who get social security don't really deserve any help?
1 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Change in the difference between 
readers and non-readers after the riots 
0.26
**
 
(0.094) 
0.26
**
 
(0.093) 
0.26
**
 
(0.093) 
0.26
**
 
(0.094) 
0.26
**
 
(0.094) 
0.27
**
 
(0.093) 
0.26
**
 
(0.094) 
0.26
**
 
(0.094) 
0.26
**
 
(0.094) 
0.25
**
 
(0.095) 
           
Difference between readers and non-
readers before the riots 
0.0015 
(0.067) 
-0.042 
(0.067) 
-0.043 
(0.067) 
-0.033 
(0.068) 
-0.034 
(0.067) 
-0.053 
(0.066) 
-0.054 
(0.068) 
-0.052 
(0.068) 
-0.051 
(0.068) 
-0.044 
(0.068) 
           
Change in attitudes among non-
readers before-and-after riots 
-0.14
*
 
(0.061) 
-0.13
*
 
(0.061) 
-0.13
*
 
(0.061) 
-0.12 
(0.062) 
-0.12
*
 
(0.062) 
-0.14
*
 
(0.062) 
-0.14
*
 
(0.063) 
-0.14
*
 
(0.063) 
-0.14
*
 
(0.063) 
-0.14
*
 
(0.064) 
           
Age  
 
0.0058
**
 
(0.0013) 
0.0058
**
 
(0.0013) 
0.0045
**
 
(0.0015) 
0.0029 
(0.0017) 
0.0011 
(0.0017) 
0.00096 
(0.0018) 
0.0012 
(0.0019) 
0.0013 
(0.0020) 
0.0013 
(0.0020) 
           
Female  
 
 
 
-0.018 
(0.046) 
-0.028 
(0.047) 
-0.021 
(0.047) 
-0.0078 
(0.047) 
0.00087 
(0.050) 
0.00094 
(0.050) 
0.0026 
(0.050) 
0.0049 
(0.050) 
           
Highest educational attainment
2 
          
CSE, O Level or equivalent  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.053 
(0.068) 
-0.063 
(0.069) 
-0.095 
(0.068) 
-0.071 
(0.071) 
-0.072 
(0.071) 
-0.073 
(0.071) 
-0.079 
(0.071) 
           
A level or equivalent  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.068 
(0.080) 
-0.071 
(0.081) 
-0.087 
(0.081) 
-0.062 
(0.084) 
-0.062 
(0.085) 
-0.065 
(0.084) 
-0.069 
(0.085) 
           
Higher education below degree  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.18
*
 
(0.086) 
-0.20
*
 
(0.086) 
-0.22
*
 
(0.086) 
-0.15 
(0.092) 
-0.15 
(0.092) 
-0.15 
(0.092) 
-0.16 
(0.092) 
           
Degree or equivalent  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.25
**
 
(0.076) 
-0.28
**
 
(0.076) 
-0.27
**
 
(0.077) 
-0.16 
(0.089) 
-0.16 
(0.089) 
-0.17 
(0.090) 
-0.17 
(0.090) 
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Marital Status
3 
          
Separated or Divorced  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.20
**
 
(0.072) 
-0.17
*
 
(0.071) 
-0.16
*
 
(0.071) 
-0.16
*
 
(0.071) 
-0.16
*
 
(0.071) 
-0.16
*
 
(0.071) 
           
Widowed  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.045 
(0.088) 
-0.026 
(0.087) 
-0.033 
(0.090) 
-0.034 
(0.090) 
-0.034 
(0.090) 
-0.030 
(0.090) 
           
Never married  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.19
**
 
(0.067) 
-0.15
*
 
(0.066) 
-0.14
*
 
(0.069) 
-0.14
*
 
(0.069) 
-0.14
*
 
(0.069) 
-0.15
*
 
(0.069) 
           
Party identification
4 
          
Labour  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.41
**
 
(0.060) 
-0.43
**
 
(0.061) 
-0.43
**
 
(0.061) 
-0.43
**
 
(0.061) 
-0.42
**
 
(0.062) 
           
Liberal Democrat  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.57
**
 
(0.082) 
-0.56
**
 
(0.083) 
-0.56
**
 
(0.083) 
-0.56
**
 
(0.082) 
-0.56
**
 
(0.083) 
           
Other party  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.099 
(0.12) 
-0.13 
(0.12) 
-0.13 
(0.12) 
-0.13 
(0.12) 
-0.092 
(0.13) 
           
None  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.27
**
 
(0.075) 
-0.29
**
 
(0.076) 
-0.30
**
 
(0.076) 
-0.29
**
 
(0.076) 
-0.29
**
 
(0.076) 
           
Green Party  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.74
**
 
(0.15) 
-0.81
**
 
(0.15) 
-0.81
**
 
(0.15) 
-0.81
**
 
(0.15) 
-0.81
**
 
(0.15) 
           
Other   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.24
*
 
(0.095) 
-0.22
*
 
(0.096) 
-0.22
*
 
(0.096) 
-0.22
*
 
(0.096) 
-0.21
*
 
(0.097) 
           
NSSEC Social class
5 
          
Lower supervisory and technical       0.050 0.051 0.053 0.063 
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      (0.089) (0.089) (0.090) (0.090) 
           
Employers in small organizations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.084 
(0.086) 
0.082 
(0.086) 
0.081 
(0.086) 
0.079 
(0.086) 
           
Intermediate occupations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.012 
(0.080) 
-0.010 
(0.081) 
-0.012 
(0.081) 
-0.0024 
(0.080) 
           
Managerial & professional  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.16
*
 
(0.070) 
-0.16
*
 
(0.070) 
-0.16
*
 
(0.071) 
-0.16
*
 
(0.071) 
           
Watch TV News at least daily  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.017 
(0.032) 
-0.018 
(0.032) 
-0.016 
(0.032) 
           
Read web-based news at least daily  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0094 
(0.028) 
0.0095 
(0.028) 
           
Region
6 
          
Midlands  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.11 
(0.072) 
           
South West  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.066 
(0.086) 
           
East/South East  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.043 
(0.064) 
           
London  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.052 
(0.10) 
           
Wales  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.090 
(0.11) 
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Scotland  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.035 
(0.12) 
           
Constant 3.11
**
 
(0.044) 
2.85
**
 
(0.077) 
2.88
**
 
(0.11) 
3.04
**
 
(0.14) 
3.18
**
 
(0.14) 
3.51
**
 
(0.15) 
3.54
**
 
(0.16) 
3.56
**
 
(0.16) 
3.55
**
 
(0.17) 
3.50
**
 
(0.17) 
Observations 2160 2159 2159 2125 2123 2121 2047 2046 2046 2046 
R
2
 0.0084 0.019 0.019 0.029 0.035 0.074 0.079 0.080 0.080 0.082 
Notes: All models are weighted. Pre-riots includes those interviewed before August 6
th
 2011. Post-riots sample includes those who were interviewed after between August 
10
th
 2011 and the end of the data collection in October 2011. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01 
1 – Many people who get social security don't really deserve any help? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
2 – Male is baseline 
3 – Married is baseline 
4 – Conservative is baseline 
5 – Semi-routine and routine manual 
6 – North is baseline 
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Web Appendix 15: Effect (β coefficients) of newspaper readership on attitudes toward 
welfare recipients before and after the riots without control variables, from linear difference-
in-difference models 
 Don’t really 
deserve help
1 
Could find a 
job
2 
Dole 
cheating
3 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Change in the difference between readers 
and non-readers after the riots 
0.26
**
 
(0.094) 
0.24
*
 
(0.10) 
0.25
**
 
(0.098) 
    
Difference between readers and non-readers 
before the riots 
0.0015 
(0.067) 
-0.069 
(0.069) 
-0.071 
(0.070) 
    
Change in attitudes among non-readers 
before-and-after riots 
-0.14
*
 
(0.061) 
-0.10 
(0.068) 
-0.11 
(0.062) 
    
Constant 3.11
**
 
(0.044) 
3.52
**
 
(0.047) 
3.17
**
 
(0.044) 
    
Observations 2160 2161 2159 
R
2
 0.0084 0.0038 0.0044 
Notes: All models are weighted. Constant is reported as Pre-riots non-newspaper reader. Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01.  
1 – Many people who get social security don't really deserve any help? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
2 – Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 
Agree strongly] 
3 – Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
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Web Appendix 16: Effect (β coefficients) of the ideology of newspaper readership on 
attitudes toward welfare recipients before and after the riots, from linear difference-in-
difference models 
 Don’t really 
deserve 
help
1 
Could 
find a 
job
2 
Dole 
cheating
3 
Support for 
Welfare 
state
4
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Change in the difference between 
left-leaning readers and right-leaning 
readers after the riots 
-0.32 
(0.20) 
-0.046 
(0.20) 
-0.039 
(0.21) 
0.20 
(0.13) 
     
Difference between left-leaning 
readers and right-leaning readers 
before the riots 
-0.17 
(0.15) 
-0.28 
(0.15) 
-0.28 
(0.17) 
0.20
*
 
(0.093) 
     
Change in attitudes among right-
leaning readers before-and-after riots 
-0.18 
(0.21) 
0.057 
(0.24) 
-0.0067 
(0.24) 
0.084 
(0.15) 
     
Constant 3.58
**
 
(0.088) 
3.57
**
 
(0.098) 
3.44
**
 
(0.099) 
2.70
**
 
(0.058) 
     
Observations 626 625 626 626 
R
2
 0.13 0.042 0.081 0.14 
Notes: All models are weighted. Constant is reported as Pre-riots non-newspaper reader. Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01. All models adjusted for education and political affiliation. 
1 – Many people who get social security don't really deserve any help? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
2 – Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 
Agree strongly] 
3 – Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another? [1 Disagree strongly, 5 Agree strongly] 
4 – Welfarism scale [1 – poor do not deserve help, 5 – Sympathetic to welfare state]. Combined and scaled 
measure of the following variables of the other 5 variables included in this table and the three main indicators 
used in the analysis: Welfare recipients don’t really deserve help, could find a job, and they cheat on the dole. 
 
